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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

PETE MOLETON,
Plaiintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation, and P ACIFIC FRUIT EXPRESS COMpANY, a corporation,

7379

Defendants arnd Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this brief we shall designate the parties as they
appear in the trial court.
All italics appearing in the brief are added.
'The figures in parentheses refer to the pages of the
record.
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The defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company,
will be referred to herein as the railroad company and
the defendant, Pacific Fruit Expres.s Company, will
be referred to as the express company.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment (R.
66), entered in favor of the defendants, and each of them,
and against the plaintiff "No Cause for Action." This
judgment was entered upon the court granting the defendants' motion for nonsuit and for the dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint, which motion.s were made after
the plaintiff had rested (R. 267-277). This action was
brought by plaintiff to recover the sum of $100,000.00 for
permanent injuries received by plaintiff while working in the yards of the defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, at Laramie, Wyoming on the 22nd day
of November, 1945.
The complaint in this case was divided into three
causes of action. Each cause of action set forth a separate and distinct theory upon which plaintiff claimed
that he could recover for the permanent injuries which
he had suffered (R. 1-18).
The first cau.se of action is founded upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the plaintiff therein
alleges that the two defendants are common carriers by
railroad in interstate commerce and that plaintiff was
employed by them in such commerce.
The second cause of action is against the express
company alone. This cause of action is divided into two
counts. Plaintiff alleged in each count that he was emSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ployed by said express company. Under the first count
the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is engaged in
operating a railroad within the State of Wyoming as
a common enterprise with the Union Pacific Railroad
Company. Plaintiff under this count relies upon the
statutes of the State of Wyoming which applies to railroad companies operated within the State of Wyoming
(R. 9-11). This act is very similar to the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
In answer to this first count of the second cause of
action the defendantB deny that the express company operates a railroad within the State of Wyoming and hence
does not come within the said statutes (R. 30-31).
The second count of the second cause of action is
based upon the theory that the express company had
failed to comply with the statutes of the state of Wyoming requiring the contribution by employers to the
Industrial Accident Fund. Under the statutes of Wyoming Buch failure permits the employees of such employer to maintain their common law actions for injuries (R. 11-12).
In answer to this second count the defendants denied
that the express company was subject to the Workman's
Compensation Act of Wyoming, relying upon Section
72-105 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, wherein
it is provided that the Wyoming Compensation laws do
not apply to businesses or employment which, according
to law, are engaged in interstate commerce (R. 31, 47-49).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The third cause of action is against the railroad
company and is based upon the theory that the relationship of employer and employee does not exist between the
plaintiff and the railroad company and that plaintiff
suffered his injuries by reason of the negligence of the
railroad company (R. 13-16).
The negligence set forth in the various causes of action contained in the complaint are almost identical.
Under the first cause of action plaintiff alleges that
he was employed by the defendants as an iceman and in
the performance of his duties in the wintertime was
1 equired to descend into bunkers on refrigerator cars
to regulate burning heaters whirh generated carbon monoxide gas. He further alleges that this gas accumulated
and was known to accumulate by defendants in these
bunkers, making it extremely hazardous to him in the
performance of his duties. He alleges that they failed
to use reasonable care to furnish him a reasonably
safe place to work in that this condition existed in the
bunkers, and that the defendants neglected to provide
any means of removing and discharging the carbon monoxide gas. Plaintiff further contends that the defendants were negligent in not providing any methods or
means whereby plaintiff could be saved or rescued by
the peril created by the presence of said gas, and the
defendants failed to provide a sufficie~t crew to assist
in the performance of these hazardous duties. Plaintiff further relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
These grounds of negligence are realleged in the
second cause of action.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
In the third cause of action plaintiff alleges that
the railroad, knowing that carbon monoxide gas had
nccumulated in the refrigerator cars and knowing of
its dangerous characteristics, negligently instructed
plaintiff to adjust the heaters therein without help or
essistance and without providing means whereby plaintiff could be saved or rescued from said gas and without warning plaintiff of the presence of said gas.
It was further alleged that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applied and that the defendant, knowing of
the presence of the carbon monoxide gas in the bunkers
and that plaintiff would be unable to discover its presence, the railroad company negligently neglected to give
plaintiff warning of the ·existence of the said gas and the
hazard thereby created, and the railroad company neglected to ventilate said car or provide mean.s for the
removal of said gas (R.14-16).

·The defendants denied all of the acts of negligence
and in their answer alleged as affirmative defenses
contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant doctrine.
We have set out the pleadings to inform the court of
the various issues which were involved before the trial
court. However, on this appeal we are only interested
in the first cause of action. We have set forth the allegations of the second and third causes of action so that
the court may be informed of the position taken by the
parties with respect to these two causes of action. It
is to be noted that the defendants contend that the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiff is entitled to no form of compensation for the injuries which he has received. By their position in this
case they reflect the extent to which they claim they have
insulated themselves against liability for injuries to employees working on trains in interstate commerce.
We feel that our position on the first cause of action
is well taken and that it is unnecessary to belabor the
points raised in the second and third causes of action on
this appeal.
STATEl\IENT OF THE CASE
In setting out the statement of facts, we shall divide
it into four classifications, to wit: (a) The Laramie
Yards; (b) The conduct of business in those yards; (c)
The plaintiff's employment; (d) The event of plaintiff's injuries. The trial court in granting the motions
for nonsuit did not specify the grounds upon which they
were granted. Although the record does not show it,
~rguments and discussion on the motions were devoted
almost entirely to whether or not the Federal Employers' Liability Act was applicable to this case.
(a) THE LARAMIE YARDS

The Laramie Yards, in which plaintiff was injured
on November 22, 1945, are approximately two miles
long and two blocks wide. The railroad company owns all
of the tracks in this yard and is the only railroad that
transports trains or cars either into or out of these yards
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(R. 21~, 213). These trains contain cars from many different railroads (R. 213).
Laramie is a terminal and all engines are changed
in thes·e yards, that is, when a train comes into the yard
the engine is disconnected from the train and replaced
by a fresh engine (R. 235 ). When these trains arrive
there is generally quite a bit of work to do on them and
in some instances they are completely broken up and
remade before they proceed on their journey (R. 234).
The yard at Laramie is also a regular inspection
point (R. 221) and cars containing perishable produce
and commodities are serviced by icing and regulating
heaters and ventilators (R. 214). This perishable freight
consists of such items as fresh meat, sweet potatoes,
spuds, beer, wines and grapefruit (R. 213).
(b) THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS IN THOSE YARDS

A Yard Office is maintained in these Laramie Yards
by the railroad company and into which comes all infor-

mation concerning trains coming into the yard. This
information is made available to all persons who may
have work to do on the train so that they may know
what work must be done before the train proceeds on
its journey. This work consists of switching operations
(R.- 235) and also the inspection and regulation of heaters on refrigerator cars (R. 214).
The information concerning· a train is received at
the yard office about an hour before the train arrives
in order that preparations may be made for the work
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to be done and the train may proceed on its jori.rney without undue delay (R. 230).
The procedure by which this 'information i.s forwarded to the yard office was described in the testimony. Trains proceeding toward· the Laramie Yards
would be in charge of the conductor who would have the
waybills on the various cars and freight contained therein. From these waybills he would make up a switch list
(R. 230). A copy of the switch list of the train involved
in this case was introduced in evidence as defendant 'a
Exhibit "5". A perusal of the switch list will show the
type of information accumulated by the conductor in
making up this list. The number of each car and the
company owning it was listed, the class of freight, the
contents of ·each car and its destination was aloo placed
on this list. The waybill instructions were given and particularly instructions were given concerning the perishable freight. It being wintertime, when the train involved .in this case approached Laramie the directions
. for this perishable freight concerned the temperature
at which these cars must be kept to prevent :freezing
of the freight contained therein.
This switch list, after its preparation, is dropped
off by the conductor at. some telegraph station along
the line. The dispatcher at the station then forwards this
information, either by telegraph or telephone, to the
yard office at Laramie. In the yard office is made up
a consist from the information so obtained from the
conductor. Enough copies of this are made for all persons who may have work to do on the train. The conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sists are then. hung on a tab in the office to be picked up
by the various persons concerned with getting the train
in readiness for its journey. All of the persons who
have anything to do with the making up and forwarding
of this information are persons in the general employ of
the railroad company ( R. 230, 231).
In the yard office the railroad company employs a
yardmaster. From the information, forwarded to the
yard office, he determines how he is going to make up
and break up the train. He in turn· gives this information to the yardmen and to the· switchmen (R. 230,
231).

The expreos company has a couple of desks in the
yard office and persons in the general employ of the
express company in the yard office obtain a copy of these
consists just as does the railroad company •yardmaster
(R. 231). The parties stipulated that a copy of Exhibit
"5" was furnished by the railroad company to the
express company yard clerk in the yards at Laramie
on the occaoion of the arrival of· the train involved in
this case. This exhibit was then furnished to the persons working in the yard under the general employ of the
express company in order that they could perform their
work on the train (R. 233).
The yardmaster would determine from the information he received where the trains coming into Laramie
would be stopped and on what tracks and he in turn
. would inform the express company general employees
what tracks were clear and on what tracks he intended
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to put the trains (R. 234). The yardma.ster would leave
a list similar to Exhibit '' 5'' on the caboose for the men
on the switch engine working at the rear end of the
train so that these men would know what work was to
be done on that end of the train (R. 234). It was the
yardmaster's responsibility to carry out the necessary
things which were required by the information contained
en the switch list. It was also the responsibility of the
express company to take care of the work to be done
on the refrigerator cars as disclosed by the information
contained on this list (R. 245).
The foreman of the express company receives his
information as to what should be done on the cars over
the phone from the yard office. The foreman by those
directions is told at what temperature the heaters are to
be lighted or the temperature at which the heaters are
to be extinguished (R. 215, 220, 221). The foreman has
r.:.othing to do with where the trains are placed in the
yard and has nothing to do with the time that these
trains come into or leave the yards (R. 215).
These refrigerator cars are owned by various companies, including the Pacific Fruit Express, the Swift
Company, the Armour Company, the Rath, and the Canadian Pacific (R. 221). The general employees of the
express company perform the necessary work on all of
these refrigerator cars in the railroad company's trains
regardless of what company owns them. It should be
noted that the car from which plaintiff fell and was injured was not a car owned by the Pacific Fruit Express
(R. 126, 127).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The work of the plaintiff and others in the general
employ of the express company was gone into much more
in detail than the work performed by the general employees of the railroad company. This was natural because plaintiff was injured while in the performance
of his dutie.s in regulating the heaters on the refrigerator
cars.

It appeared from the evidence that when the foreman obtained the necessary information he would then
direct plaintiff and other employees of the express company what was to be done on the refrigerator cars and
gave them the numbers of the cars on which this work
was to be done. He also informed them of the track
on which the train was to be placed and the time of
its arrival.
A rule had been promulgated and was posted in
the yards by the express company. The so-called ''Safety
First Rules" were introduced in evidence as defendant's
Exhibit "4". Rule 19 d. provided:

''When inspecting cars or lighting heaters
at regular inspection points, not less than two
employees must work together for each other's
protection.''
This rule, requiring two employees to work together in
the adjusting of heater.s, was usually followed in the
yards (R. 218).
It was stipulated by the parties that the express
~ompany was a Utah corporation, organized in 1906
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and that with the exception of a relatively small number
of shares the stock of the express company was owned
in equal amounts by the defendants Union Pacific Railroad Company and the Southern Pacific Company.
It was further stipulated that no members of the Board
of Directors of either the Southern Pacific Company or
the Union Pacific Railroad Company were members of
the Board of Directors of the express company.
It was also stipulated that the express company performs the same or similar services for at least four railroads, to-wit: The Southern Pacific, The Union Pacific,
The Western Pacific and the Mexican railroad (R. 266267). However, it was also stipulated that this was not
true in the yards of the railroad company located in
Laramie, Wyoming (R. 267). The evidence conclusively
establishes that the only services rendered by the express company nominal employees was to the defendant,
Union Pacific Railroad Company.
(c) THE PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT

At the time of receiving his injuries plaintiff was
in the general employment of the express company (R.
141). He had worked for them since 1925 (R. 72). He
was not on the payroll of the railroad company and he
received his check from the express company. If there
had been occasion to fire him it would have been done
by the express company (R.141, 142).
The foreman of the express company told him
·what work to do (R. 143). In performing the work on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the heater cars the men on the job determined whether
or not charcoal was to be placed therein and how much
(R. 146). On occasions plaintiff would determine whether
the bunker walls should be adjusted (R. 148). Plaintiff
also determined how long he would leave a plug out before he climbed into the bunker (R.149).
It appears that the directions given plaintiff were
from information and instruction.:; given to the express
company by the railroad company and obtained by that
company from the waybills on the various cars and
freight in the train. This information was accumulated
by the railroad company's conductor and placed on a
switch list which eventually came into the hands of all
persons who worked on the train, whether nominally employed by the express company or the railroad company.
(d) THE EVENT OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES

Plaintiff was injured on the 22nd day of November,
1945, at which time he was 53 years of a_ge. At that time
he had worked for the Pacific Fruit Express for more
than twenty years; during this time his duties had been
to take care of the inspection and handling of refrigerr.tor cars. In the summertime he iced these refrigerator
cars and in the wintertime he took care of the heaters
(R. 73, 74).
Pictures of one of these refrigerator cars wa.s introduced in evidence as defendants' Exhibits '' 1'' and
"3". These cars are about 15 or 16 feet from the top
of the rail to the top of the car (R. 75); from the floor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the ceiling is from 8 to 10 feet; the car is about 10 feet
wide (R. 75); the cars have an ice bunker in each end.
These bunkers are about 3 feet to 3% feet wide. The
bottom of these. bunkers, or the floor, is made of tin or
steel. The bunkers are separated from the rest of the
cars by either wood or steel partitions (R. 78). To get
into the bunkers the men climb a ladder on the side of
the car to the top of the car and open the door or plug
of the bunker. The men then climb down the ladder
on the inside of the bunker to the floor (R. 81).
In the summertime the cars were brought to the
icing docks and ice and salt placed in the bunkers (R.
82). In the winter months plaintiff's work consisted of
regulating the heaters by either putting charcoal in them
or by shutting them off, as the weather required (R. 90).
On occasions it was necessary to place ice in cars which
contained meat (R. 91). Plaintiff, in the performance
of his duties, worked on refrigerator cars owned by various companies including the Fruit Growers' Express and
the American Refrigerator Company (R. 92). During
the wintertime the plaintiff at all times worked with two
men and sometimes with three (R. 92). His foreman
would tell him on which track the train was located.
In describing the way the work was usually done
the plaintiff testified that at least two men were supposed
to perform the duties of regulating the heaters in the
bunkers (R. 96). After climbing to the top of the car
one of the plugs is opened by the use of a pick handle;
after the plug is open one of the men descends into the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bunker and either shuts off the heater or puts more
eharcoal into it; the other man goes on to the next bunker
and performs the same dutie-s. Plaintiff testified that
sometimes he noticed that there was gas in the bunkers.
He determined the presence of gas by the fact that he
would get dizzy, not while he was down in the bunker,
but as soon as he got out into the fresh air (R. 93-96).
On the day that the plaintiff was injured he arrived
at work at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. At that time
there were four men working, plaintiff, the foreman and
two other men. On this particular day, Riley was the
foreman. In the testimony of the plaintiff, this man
i.5 referred to as Rowley (R. 97). During the morning
the plaintiff did not work on any of the refrigerator cars,
but as he remembered it, he did some cleaning up in the
yards. Shortly before noon a westbound train consisting of 50 or 60 cars pulled into the yards at Laramie.
It pulled in on Track No. 10 (R. 99, 100). Just before
the train arrived plaintiff and the foreman were the only
men on duty, the other two men having gone to dinner at
about 11 :30. The foreman told plaintiff to work on this
train and that there were three reefers, which is the name
that the men give to these refrigerator cars. He was told
that there were three heater-s which he was to regulate
by shutting them off (R. 101, 102, 150) and he was given
the numbers of the cars (R. 104). Because plaintiff
would have to walk about a half a mile to the point where
he was to perform his duties, he started for Track No.
10 before the train arrived (R. 101, 103). The reefers
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on which plaintiff was to work were at the head end
of the train, which would be the west end. Plaintiff
started walking along the track toward the west (R.
104) and the foreman remained in the shanty (R. 152,
153). Plaintiff went alone to regulate these heaters
(R. 105).
When he arrived at the first car upon which he was
to work he climbed up on top of that car by means of
the south ladder (R. 132) and opened the plug. He
then proceeded to the other two car3 opening the plug
on each. In performing this work he walke·d along
the top of the cars and did not dismount. He opened
all of the plugs before he entered the bunkers in order
to let the carbon monoxide gas out which had been
generated by the burning heaters (R. 193). Plaintiff
estimated that it took him about four minutes to open
these plugs and return to the first car on which he had
opened the plug (R. 199).
After returning to this first car he descended by
means of the ladder and shut off the burning heater
(R. 204). He climbed out of the bunker and proceeded
on to the second car. He descended into the bunker, shut
off the heater, climbed out and proceeded on to the third
car. He estimated that the plug in the third car had
been open between ten and twelve minutes (R. 200).
He climbed down the ladder in this car, shut off the
heater, and then climbed out by means of the ladder.
When he got into the fresh air he lost consciousness and
this is the last that he remembers until he came to lying
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on the ground near the car from which he had fallen
(R. 106-109).
Plaintiff did not know the name of the car or its
number: he did know, however, that it was the reefer
at the head end of the train. It was stipulated that the
car from which plaintiff fell was F.D.E.X. 9084 (R. 126,
127). This car was the second car from the head end (R.
129). It was a car of the Fruit Growers Express and not
of the defendant express company (See Exhibit "1").
Plaintiff testified that he remembered coming out of
the bunker on this car and that he remembered putting
the plug in place but that he did not remember anything
after that (R. 110). He fixed the time at which he fell
off the car at about five minutes to twelve (R. 112).
Plaintiff testified that he knew that the safe way
is to open the plugs on both ends so the gas can get
out and there is ventilation through the car, and he
stated that he didn't do it on this occasion because the
train was in a hurry and the foreman had so told him
(R. 193). Plaintiff, in answering the question as to why
he did not open all of those plugs, testified as follows
(R. 206):

''A. This foreman told me this train been supposed to stay· about five or six minutes in
the yard, and he call 'hot shot', you know, got
to go quick. He told me how much, you can
quick open up one plug, that is plenty, this
foreman told me.
He did~
A. Yes.
Q.
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Q.

What do they mean, it was a 'hot shot'?

A.

Sometimes, you know, this train like sometime coming one train, two train, they have
stock, and they have got to get out of town.

Q.

He told you that?

A.

Yes.''

!a

It also appeared that the rear end plugs on at least
two of the cars were sealed and plaintiff could not re- , .
member as to the third car (R. 205, 206). Plaintiff had _
not received orders from his foreman permitting him
to break the seals (R. 205) and in the absence of such
order he could not break the ·.seals (R. 223).
Syler, a foreman for the Pacific Fruit Express
Company and who had worked on the refrigerator cars
containin_g these charcoal burners since 1929, testified
that the burning heaters created and caused gas fumes
within the bunkers (R. 215). It was stipulated by the
parties that the gas which was created or formed in
the bunkers wa.s carbon monoxide gas (R. 216). Syler
testified that he had seen fellows getting headaches
from this gas and that they had a "bad feeling" after
working too many of these cars (R. 216).
A person is affected by these gas fumes more after
he has been in the car and has ·come out into the fresh
air. This gas doe.s not have an odor and it cannot be
seen (R. 219).
For protection of the men from these fumes Safety
Rule 19 d. requiring two men to work together had
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been promulgated and had been in force in the Laramie
Yards since 1929 (R. 218, 219).

Plaintiff testified that sometimes he was able to
tell whether or not there was gas in the bunker and at
other times that he ·was not able to tell (R. 112). On
the occasion of his injury he testified that he figured
that the gas ·was out of the bunkers because he had
opened up the three plugs as above indicated. He was
not dizzy while he was working on either of the first
two cars. As he came out of the bunker on the third car
- he felt the same as he did at any other time. He testified
- that he had to bend a little bit when he shut the plug
and that when he raised up that is the last he remembered
(R. 113, 114) and at that time he fell from the car.
When he regained consciousness he was suffering from
"plenty pain". He testified that the pain was in his
right hip, that three ribs were broken and that he was
skinned on one side. He laid on the ground for two hours
before he was taken to the hospital at Laramie (R. 114,
140).
Plaintiff then testified to the treatment which he
received at the hospital, the fact that he was placed in
a cast, and the misery and pain which this treatment
caused him to suffer. He also testified that he was required to return to hospitals several times and that
various -doctors treated him. These matters are of no
importance on this appeal other than to indicate that
- the plaintiff did suffer severe and permanent injuries
and suffered severe pain.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Comes now the plaintiff and appellant in the aboveentitled action and assigns the following errors committed by the trial court and upon which he relies for
a reversal of the judgment entered against him:
The trial court erred in granting a motion for
a nonsuit as to plaintiff's first cause of action made by
the defendant and respondent, Union Pacific Railroad
Company, and entering a judgment pursuant thereto
dismissing plaintiff's cam:;e of action. (See Points I,
II and IV of this brief).
1.

2. The trial court erred in granting a motion for
a nonsuit as to plaintiff's first cause of action made by
the defendant and respondent, Pacific Fruit Express
Company, and entering a judgment pursuant thereto dismissing plaintiff's cause of action. (See Pointa III and
IV of this brief).
3. The trial court erred in granting the motion
for a nonsuit upon the first count of the plaintiff's second cause of action, said motion being made by the defendant, Pacific Fruit E~press Company, and in entering the judgment dismissing plaintiff's action.
4.

The trial court erred in granting the motion for

a nonsuit on the second count of the plaintiff's second
cause of action, said motion being made by the defendant, Pacific Fruit Express Company, and in entering
judgment dismissing plaintiff's action.
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5. The trial court erred in g-ranting the motion for
a nonsuit on plaintiff's third cause of action made by
the defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company, and
entering judgment dismissing plaintiff's action.
SU~Il\:fARY

OF ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFF, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
F.E.L.A., WAS EMPLOYED BY THE DEFENDANT, UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, WHICH ADMITTEDLY
WAS ENGAGED AS A COMMON CARRIER BY RAILROAD
·IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

POINT II.
THE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY DEFENDANT RAILROAD COMPANY SEEKS TO HAVE EMPLOYEES OF THE
EXPRESS COMPANY AND NOT ITS OWN EMPLOYEES
PERFORM NECESSARY SERVICES ON ITS INTERSTATE
TRAINS AND CARS IS A CONTRACT OR DEVICE IN VIOLATION OF 45 U.S.C.A., SECTION 55.

POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT EXPRESS COMPANY AT THE TIME
OF PLAINTIFF'S IN JURIES WAS A COMMON CARRIER
BY RAILROAD IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

POINT IV.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED
IN THIS CASE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE CONTRIBUTED IN WHOLE OR IN PART TO THE
INJURIES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFF, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
F'.E.L.A., WAS EMPLOYED BY THE DEFENDANT, UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, WHICH ADMITTEDLY
WAS ENGAGED AS A COMMON CARRIER BY RAILROAD
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

Whose work was plaintiff performing at the time
he wa.s injured and during the time he was discharging
the duties of his employment in the Laramie Yards1
If plaintiff was performing the work of the railroad company then he was in the employ of that company and this action is properly founded upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The railroad company owned the yard and tracks
at Laramie. It was the only company which transported
trains in and out of that yard. The only trains which
were worked on in those yards were the trains of that
company. It was the one that determined what time the
trains should come into the yard and what time they
should leave. It determined on what tracks the trains
should be placed and where the work was to be performed.
What cars and what freight should be brought into
the yard and what should be done with them was determined by that company. It was the one that determined the destination of the cars and it was the one that
gave directions as to the inspection and work which
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should be performed upon those cars. It was the company that dealt with the shippers and waybills were
made out by it. From these waybills and the commodities carried it determined the temperature at which the
refrigerator cars were to be transported.
An examination of Exhibit "5", the switch list,
discloses the directions it gave for the handling of the
cars and freight in the Laramie Yard. Based upon the
information and direction set forth in thia exhibit every
person working in the yard on this train knew exactly
what to do in readying this train for its continued interstate journey. Everyone working on this train was
given the very same information regardless of whether
he was nominally employed by the express company or
the railroad company.
The work to be done on these trains consisted principally of switching, changing engines and servicing cars
containing perishable freight. The name of the document by which the information concerning the train is
distributed is significant. It is designated:
''SWITCH LIST AND
SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS
PERISHABLE FREIGHT''
In the upper right-hand corner is the following:
''TO AGENT OR INSPECTOR
Carload Perishable Freight must be serviced in
accordance with waybill instructions shown beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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low. Position of ventilators is to be recorded
under 'Arrival' and 'Departure' columns, show
'0' for Open, 'C' for Clol3ed."
Here is a direct instruction to the nominal employees
of the e:x:press company what they must do to the cars
in this train of the railroad company. Turning to the
second page of this exhibit we find the instructions concerning the three cars on which plaintiff worked. They
are the 2nd, 6th and 7th cars on the train. We are not
able to decipher exactly what the abreviations mean,
but the waybill instructions on these cars in the order
worked by plaintiff are as follows:
47 CPS Htr 35° above
47 --- -- 35°
60 SPS Lt Htrs 15 Ext 20°
These instructions were interpreted to mean that
under the conditions at Laramie the heaters in these
cats were to be extinguished. The employees working
on the refrigerator cars followed these instructions
given by the railroad company and the heaters on the
cars in that company's train were shut off by plaintiff.
We submit that under these circumstances the work
being performed by plaintiff was the work of the railroad company and was conducted in its yards and on
cars in its train being transported by it for its shippers
and the work was done pursuant to specific directions
and instructions given by it. Plaintiff was therefore
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its employee in performing its work. This assertion
is supported by the authorities.
The case of Linstead r. Chesape·ake & 0. Ry. Co.,
276 U.S. 28, 48 S. Ct. 241, 72 L. Ed. 453 (1928), sustains
plaintiff's position here. The problem there was the
same a8 in the case at bar, that is, whether the workman involved was an employee of the defendant within
the meaning of F .E.L.A. The action was brought under
that statute.
The plaintiff's deceased was employed as a freight
conductor by the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
Louis Ry. Co., known as the ''Big Four.'' He and the
other members of his crew were paid by that company
and they were not subject to discharge by the defendant.
The Big Four and the defendant were connecting
carriers. The tracks of the Big Four were west of Cincinnati and the defendant's track8 were east. The east
end of the defendant's terminal yard was at Stevens,
Kentuck'Y, some 13 miles east of Cincinnati. The interchange of traffic between these two companies was accomplished by an arrangement whereby the Big Four
sent an engine, caboose and train crew over the rails of
the defendant to Stevens and then picked up and brought
to Cincinnati cars destined to be tranaported by the Big
Four west of Cincinnati. Defendant did not pay the
Big Four for this service, but it sent its engines etc.,
west of Cincinnati on Big Four rails and returned cars
destined to be transported by it east of Cincinnati.
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While operating the Big Four train on defendant's
tracks the crew was under the supervision of defendant's trainmaster and the crew obeyed the signals of the
defendant's switch tenders and complied with the defendant's operating rules.
On the morning of the accident, the deceased was
acting as conductor of the Big Four locomotive and
caboose. The locomotive and caboose were driven to
Stevens and there picked up a train of cars containing
22 loads and 18 empties, and the train was proceeding
on its way hack to Cincinnati. A passenger train of
the defendant company collided with the rear end of the
freight train killing the conductor. The trial court instructed the jury that as a matter of law the conductor
was in the employ of the defendant company within the
meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Judg~
ment was rendered for plaintiff and the Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed on the ground that the conductor was
not employed by the defendant company, relying on the
case of Hull v. PhJiladelphia & Reading Railway Co., 252
U. S. 475, 40 S. Ct. 358, 64 L. Ed. 670 (1920). The Supreme Court, however, reversed the circuit court and
affirmed the district court, holding that the deceased conductor was as matter of law an employee of the defendant company. In reaching this result the Supreme
Court relied on Stoodard Oil Co. v. A~ders.on, 212 U. K
215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480, and the case of Fa.rwell
v. Boston & WorcestM R. R. Oo'r':p., 4 Mete. 49, 38 Am.
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Dec. 339. The ba~is for the Supre1ne Court ruling is
found in the following quotation from the latter case:

'' * * * To determine whether a given case
falls within the one class or the other we must
inquire whose is the work being performed, a
question which is usually answered by ascertaining who has the power to control and direct the
servants in the performance of their work. Here
we must carefully distinguish between authoritative direction and control, and mere suggestion as
to details or the necessary cooperation, where the
work furnished is part of a larger undertaking.''
The Court, in speaking of the case before it, stated
as follows:
''Now the work which was being done here by
Linstead and his crew was the work of the Chesapeake & Olrio Railway. It was the transportation
of cars, loaded and empty, on the Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway between Stevens and Cincinnllti.
It was work for which the Chesapeake & Ohio
road was paid according to the tariff approved
by the Interstate Commerce Commission; it was
work done under the rules adopted by the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company; and it was done
under the immediate supervision and direction of
the trainmaster in charge of the trains running
from Stevens to Cincinnati, and that trainmaster
was a superior employee of the Chesapeake &
Ohio road. We do not think that the fact that the
Big Four road paid the wages of Linstead and
his crew, or that they could only be discharged or
suspended by the Big Four, prevented their being
the servants of the Chesapeake & Ohio Company
for the performance of this particular job."
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The strength of this case as authority in favor of
the plaintiff in the case at bar is emphasized by a consideration of the case of Hull v. Philadelphia & Readitng
Ry. Co., supra. In this latter case the plaintiff's deceased was in the employ of Western ~1:aryland Ry. Co.,
as a brakeman and was killed. This company was an
interstate carrier operating a railway from Hagerstown,
Md., to Lurgan, Pa., at which point it connected with
a railway owned and operated by defendant between
Lurgan and Rutherford, Pa. By arrangement between
the two companies through freight trains were operated
from Hagerstown to Rutherford by each of the companies operating its trains over its own tracks and over
those of the other company, observing the rules of each
company on its respective lines. It was held that the
deceased was not a servant of the defendant, by which
he was killed, but only the servant of the W ~tern Maryland Company.
In distinguishing this case the Court in the Linstead
case at p. 243 stated :
'' • • • That was because the work which Hull
was doing was the work of the Western Maryland Company, even though it was carried on for
a part of the way over the rails of the Philadelphia & Reading Company. The locomotive belonged to the Western Maryland Company, the
cars belonged to the Western Maryland Company
and the loads that were carried were being carried for the Western Maryland Company, and
presumably the rates which were received for
the transportation were the receipts of the WestSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ern :Maryland Company. In other words, the
whole line between Hagerstown and Rutherford
was exactly as if it had been jointly owned by
the two companies, and jointly used by them for
their freight trains. Therefore the work was done
by the \V estern :Maryland for itself and the mere
transfer of the train owned by the Western Maryland and operated by it on to the rails of the
Philadelphia & Reading Railway did not transfer the relation of the deceased from the general
employment of the Western Maryland to a special
employment by the Philadelphia & Reading as
another master.
"In the present case there was such a transfer and the line over which the transportation
was effected and on which the work of transportation was done by the deceased was the line
of the Chesapeake & Ohio, which was master and
remained in charge of the operation, with the
immediate supervision of the Big Four crew
which was lent for the very purpose of doing the
work of the Chesapeake & Ohio.''
It is to be noted that in both the Hull and Linstead
cases the trains were being operated over the rails and
subject to the rules of the company claimed to be a
special employer of the deceased person. Different results were reached in each case. Therefore, we must
conclude that the factor of rules is not of any great
weight in a determination of whether the employees of
the company operating the train become also the employees of the company over whose tracks the trains are
being operated. Hence, the determining factor is not
the control over the employee but is whose work is being
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done. The case of James v. George F. Getty Oil Co.,
92 F. (2d) 255, decided by the 10th Circuit Court in
1937, contains an excellent discussion of the federal
cases concerning the problem under review in the case
at bar. The court relies principally on the Linstead case,
supra.
The plaintiff in the J,ones case was employed by
one Norwood in Texas to work on certain oil drilling
operations in New Mexico. The water for this operation was to be furnished to Norwood by the defendant.
This water was to come from certain wells on defendant's property. The wells came out of repair and Norwood was prevented from continuing his drilling operations because there was no other available source for obtaining water. Plaintiff, under the direction of Norwood's foreman, went to the property of the defendant
to assist in repairing the wells. This foreman then directed plaintiff to climb a "gin pole", attach a block
to the top thereof and feed a pulley through the block.
Plaintiff was standing near the top of the pole, pursuant
to the aforesaid order, when a guy wire broke allowing
the pole to fall, injuring the plaintiff.
In the performance of this work upon the premises
of the defendant the plaintiff was acting under the direction, supervision and control of Norwood and Norwood's foreman. The plaintiff was not at any time or
in any manner acting under the direction, supervision
or control of the defendant or any of its employees.
Plaintiff accepted compensation under the Workmen's
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Coml?ensation lRws from Norwood and this suit was
brought against the defendant on the theory that he was
a negligent third party.
The court held that plaintiff was a special employee
of the defendant and hence his only remedy was under
the Ke\Y 1Iexico Con1pensation Act. He could not bring
his action upon the theory which he had brought it. The
court pointed out that it frequently appears that a workman will be held to have been at the same time the general employee of his regular employer and the special
employee of the person whose work is being done. In
reaching the result that the plaintiff was an employee of
defendant, the court at p. 259, stated :
''The controlling factor is: For whom is the
work being performed, and who had the power
to control the work and the employee~ The authority to determine the work to be done, and
the manner in which it is to be carried on, necessarily includes the right to suspend or terminate
the work altogether or, possibly, to exclude the
particular employee from the job, not including
the right to discharge the employee from the service of his general employer (Norwood), nor
need it include the actual giving of directions to
the employee in connection with the work he is
doing.
"Bill Wood, the foreman, and plaintiff, and
the other members of Norwood's crew, had voluntarily entered upon said premises in said work
with the consent of said defendant, who was the
owner and in control, through his lease superintendent, Allen Stewart.''
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The court in making application of this fundamental
principle at p. 263 stated as follows:
''The ultimate test is: Whose is the work
being done~ Standard Oil Company v. Anderson,
supra. In determining whose work is being done,
the question of the power to control the work is
of great importance (Standard Oil Company v.
Anderson, supra), but is not conclusive (Linstead
v. C. & 0. R. Co.; Hull v. Philadelphia & R. R.
Co. supra). The identity of the person who, in
fact, directs the details of the work and gives the
immediate instructions to the workmen is of comparatively small importance, the power of control referred to being the power to control the
undertaking as a whole. McLamb v. DuPont Company, supra; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, supra.''
In applying the Linstead authority to this ease and
in pointing out the similarity, the court at p. 260 stated
as follows:

' ' * * * There, as here, the injured person was
under the general employ of another and was
merely temporarily doing the work of the defendant. There, as here, the work so being done was
primarily for the purpose of benefitting the general employer. There, as here, no payment to the
general employer was made or contemplated for
the doing of the work in question by its employees,
and no payment of wages to the loaned employee
was made or contempJated by the company whose
work he was doing. There, as here, however, the
work in which the employee was engaged at the
time of the injury was a part of the defendant's
regular business. The general power of control
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and supervision of the work was in the defendant,
although the injured employee was under the immediate supervision of the general employer and
was only subject to being discharged by his general employer."
The court, after a discussion of the Linstead and

HUll cases, supra, at p. 261 concludes as follows:

"* • * The determining factor, therefore, is
not the question of control over the employee,
for that was the same in both cases, but as stated
in Standard Oil Company v. Anderson, supra, it
is a question of whose work was being done. In
the Hull case the plaintiff's intestate was operating a train of his general employer, pursuant
to his general employer's obligations with its
shippers. It was, therefore, his general employer's work which was being done and he was held
to remain that company's employee. In the Linstead case the plaintiff's intestate, a general
employee of the Big Four Railroad, was carrying on an operation which the C. & 0. Company
had undertaken to perform. The work he was
performing was therefore the work of the C. & 0.
and the court held that in so doing he became
that company's special employee."
Another case of the Supreme Court of the United
States which upholds plaintiff's position here is that of
Denton v. Yazo·o & M. V. R. Co., 284 U.S. 305, 52 S. Ct.
141, 142, wherein a United States railway postal clerk
sustained injury due to the alleged negligence of one
Hunter, a porter, in the general service of the two railSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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road companies who were parties defendant. Hunter was
hired and paid by one of the defendant railroad.., and at
the time of the injury he was engaged in loading United
States mail into a mail car under the direction of a
United States postal transfer clerk, and was not as to
that work under the direction or control of either of the
railroad companies. A judgment and verdict was rendered against the two defendant companies and this judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi
and of the United State;s on the ground that Hunter at
the time of the alleged negligence was not working for
defendants, but for the United States. The United States
court stated :
''Whether the railroad companies may be
held liable for Hunter's act depends not upon
the fact that he was their servant generally, but
upon whether the work which he was doing at
the time was their work or that of another; a
question determined, usually at least, by ascertaining under whose authority and command the
work was being done. When one person puts his
servant at the disposal and under the control of
another for the performance of a particular service for the latter, the servant, in respect of his
acts in that service, is to be dealt with as the servant of the latter and not of the former. This
rule is elementary and finds support in a large
number of decision;s, a few only of which need be
cited.''
"The statutory obligation imposed upon the
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fered for transportation by the United States.
They are not required to handle, load, or receive
mail matter, but only to furnish the men necessary
for those purposes. The men so furnished handle
the mails and load them into, and receive them
from, the railway post office cars, as the regulation prescribes, 'under the direction of the transfer clerk, or clerk in charge of the car.' The work
they do is that of the government. It is said that
'direction' means nothing more than the right
to point out or indicate to the men furnished the
disposition to be made of the mail. The scope of
the word, as it is here used, is not to be thus
limited. The phrase, 'under the direction of the
transfer clerk,' would be practically meaningless
unless it comprehended the power to supervise
and control the movement. Obviously, as the evidence shows, a direction by the transfer clerk
carries with it the duty, on the part of the men
directed, to obey, and has, and was intended to
have, the force. of a command.''
Hence, in the Denbon case the court determined that
the employee was an employee not of the one hiring and
paying his wages, but of the United States Government,
for whom he was performing services at the time of his
negligence.
iSee the following cases which support the contention of plaintiff that at the time of his injuries he was
an employee of the defendant railroad company: LoveU
v. Calloway, 69 F. (2d) 532; Chioago R.I. & P. Ry. Co.
v. Norman, 165 Okla. 133, 25 P. (2d) 298; Atlantic Coast
LineR. Co. v. Tred!way's Adm'x., 120 Va. 735, 93 S. E.
560, 10 A.L.R. 1411 (writ of cert. den. 245 U. S. 670, 38
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S. Ct. 191, 62 L. Ed. 540) ; McLamb v. E. I. Du Pont De
Nemours, 79 F. (2d) 966; H·arrell v. Atlas Po·rt.lam,d Cement Co., 250 F. 83.
The Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to consider some of the foregoing authorities in the case of
Murra;y v. Wasatch Grading Oo., 73 Utah 430, 438, 274
P. 940. In that case the court ·atated:

'' * * * The adjudicated cases affecting the
principles of the common law that determine
when the relation of master and servant exists
consider five elements: (1) The selection and employment of the servant; (2) the payment of the
servant's wages; (3) the power to discharge the
servant; (4) the power to control the servant's
action.:;; and ( 5) the person whose work is being
done by the servant. It is quite generally held that
the first three elements above enumerated are not
necessary to the existence of the relationship of
master and servant. 37 L.R.A. note pages 38 to
43; 1 Labatt, Mast. & Servt. (2d Ed.) pp. 56 to
58. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480:
'In many of the cases the power of substitution
or discharge, the payment of wages and other
circumstances bearing upon the relation are
dwelt upon. They, however, are not the ultimate
facts, but only those more or less useful in determining whose is the work and whose is the
power of control.' ''
There are three recently decided Federal Circuit
Court cases which support the position of the plaintiff
in the case at bar. Each of these cases was brought under
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the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and in each case
the injured person had been employed by a person other
than the railroad company. In each instance, the plaintiff contended that he was in the special employment of
the railroad company and hence could bring his action
under the F.E.L.A. The defendant railroad company
in each case, as is true in the case at bar, contended
that the plaintiff was not an employee of the railroad
company, but in fact was the employee of the person
hiring him. These cases are Cimorelli v. New York Oent,.
R. Co., 1-!8 F. (2d) 575, Penn;.stylvarnia R. Co. v. Roth,
163 F. (2d) 161, and Penrnsylvania R. Co. v. BMlion, 172
F. (2d) 710.
In the Cimorelli case the defendant railroad company had entered into a contract with the United States
whereby the company agreed to equip, maintain and
operate in its yards at Dock Junction, Pennsylvania, a
temporary storage place for war material in transit. The
material was to be unloaded from cars, placed in open air
storage and so kept that the contents of each car could
be reloaded and moved to points of destination under
the original waybill and bill of lading. The defendant
company was to be paid for its services sums in addition
to the ordinary transportation charges and was also to be
reimbursed for its cost in preparing, equiping and maintaining the storage yards.
The defendant company contracted with the Duffy
Construction Company for the unloading and reloading
of the cars in a proper and orderly condition and at such
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places in the defendant's yard as were selected by its
superintendent. The Duffy Company was required to
furnish its own equipment and labor and it was to perform the work promptly at such times and to such extent as was reasonably required by the defendant's superintendent.
The defendant agreed to put the cars for unloading
and reloading at such places in the yard as would be
reasonably convenient for the Duffy Company. The
Duffy Company was to be paid for its services all of its
cost of the work and in addition seven cents per ton.
This additional amount was in no event to exceed ten
per cent of the cost of performing the work. ·The allowable cost items were enumerated in the contract and no
part of them was payable unless approved by the .superintendent. The contract required the Duffy Company
to keep accurate accounts and to submit copies thereof
to the defendant company. The purchase of all hand
tools, materials and supplies were to be approved in
advance by the defendant and the title to such property
was to be vested in defendant.
There was a special provision in the contract that
the Duffy Company was to perform the work as an independent contractor with exclusive supervision of the
manner and method of the performance of the work except that it was to be satisfactory to the defendant.
The plaintiff was employed by the Duffy Company
to perform some of the unloading services required by
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the contract. Plaintiff contended that due to the negligence of the defendant he was severely injured while
unloading freig·ht from a boxcar stationed on defendant's
out-door storage track. Plaintiff contended that he was
employed by the defendant. This latter contention was
denied by the defendant. The question of whether or not
the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant was submitted for determination by the trial court at the time
of the pretrial hearing. The two contracts above mentioned were submitted to the court and the trial court determined that at the time of the injuries the plaintiff was
not employed by the defendant company and his action
was dismissed. From this dismissal plaintiff appealed
to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed. It
quoted from the Federal Employers' Liability Act as
follows:

'' * * * every common carrier by railroad* * =ll'
shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier.''
The circuit court held that the words used in this section are to be construed in their natural sense and that
they describe the conventional relationship of employer
and employee.
The court also stated at p. 577 :
'' * * * And so the first question here is
whether appellee, for whom the work was being
done, had given up its proprietorship of the particular business to the Duffy Construction Company and had thus divested itself of the right of
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control, to the extent that it had no longer a legal
right to terminate the work or to direct it. If
appellee had done nothing to limit its rights with
regard to the business which was being done for
its benefit, but had retained its proprietorship
of it, each person working for the Duffy Construction Company was legally subject to appellee's
control while so engaged and was the employee
of appellee. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S.
518, 10 S. Ct. 175, 33 L. Ed. 440; The Standard
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252,
53 L. Ed. 480.''
The court recognized the difficulty of the problem
involved and stated that each case must be decided on
its own peculiar facts and ordinarily no one feature
of the relationship is determinative. The court then set
forth various testa which have been used in determining
whether or not the relationship of an employer and employee existed, as follows :

'' * * * One of the teats is who has the right
of control over the work being done. Other recognized tests are the existence -of a contract for the
performance by a person of a certain piece or
kind of work at a fixed price, the independent
nature of the contractor's business, his employment of assistants with the right to supervise
their activities, his obligation to furnish necesaary tools, supplies and materials, his right to
control the progress of the work except as to final
results, the time for which the workmen are employed, the method of payment, whether by time
or job, and whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer. The important test
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served by the employer and to what extent the
person doing the work is in fact independent in
its performance. Restatement of the law of
Agency, Y ol. 1, p. 483, ch. 7, Sec. 220. ''
The circuit court held that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant railroad company within the
meaning of the F.E.L.A. The court placed emphasis on
the fact that the defendant's superintendent selected
the place in the yards where, and fixed the time when,
the cars were either unloaded or reloaded. The court
pointed out that the part of the work to be done by
Duffy was in the railroad yards of defendant where
there was presumably a frequent movement of cars and
the defendant controlled the place where the work wa.s
to be performed. No part of these premises were surrendered to Duffy. The court also pointed out that the
whole project involved many interdependent details, the
control of any one of which could not be surrendered
without disorganization of the whole. From the very
nature of the work its performance could not be committed exclusively to the discretion of the Duffy Company.
There were other factors taken into consideration
by the court, but the foregoing are certainly things or
factors which are present in the case at bar. The railroad company here continued to control the yards and
did not turn over the control of the tracks to the express
company. The place where the work was to be performed
was determined by the defendant company. The time
that it was to be performed was fixed by the railroad
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company. It was necessary in the instance involved in
the case at bar for the plaintiff to work rapidly upon
the train because it was a manifest freight and should
leave the yard in five or six minutes not for the benefit
of the express company, but obviously for the railroad
company'a Time-Table.
In Pe'ft.nSylv~ R. Co. v. Roth, supra, the defendant railroad company had entered into a contract with
the United States Government wherein it agreed to
provide certain storage yards on the line of its railroad
and to furnish necessary labor and material for the
loading and unloading of cars. The railroad company
in turn entered into a contract with the Fritz-RumerCook Company. Under this contract this latter company
was to unload inbound cars, assemble and place the
material, remove the material from the inbound cars
and recondition it. The company was also to do certain
atenciling and marking in ·the storage yards. Under the
terms of this contract the defendant was to pay the
contracting company on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, based
upon monthly statements submitted to and certified by
the division engineer of the defendant railroad company.
Inside the storage yards the work of loading and
unloading government rna terial was carried on by the
contractor's employees under the superviaion of its yard
foreman. This foreman hired and fired the men who
worked there, directed the railroad company's switch
engines which entered the yard as to where to place
and pick up cars for loading and unloading, and superSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vised the work. The contracting company's foreman
supervised the loading of material and directed its
moYement out of the yard.
The plaintiff was employed by the contracting company and the work he did was in the storage yard cov:..
ered by the contract between the defendant railroad
company and the contracting company.
On the occasion on which he wa.s injured, the contractor was loading on to a flat car a large crane owned
by it and which had been used by it in its operations
under the contract with the defendant company. A car
inspector for the defendant explained to the contractor's
foreman the manner in which the car must be loaded
in order to comply with the regulations of the Association of American Railroads and to be acceptable for
transportation by defendant. This car inspector was
present while the loading was taking place, and made
sugge.stions as to how the crane should be fastened.
The physical work was being done by two employees
of the contractor. The plaintiff was standing on the
ground beside the car, and he testified that defendant's
car inspector asked him to hold one of the cross-ties
down, and after he had complied with the direction, the
car inspector told him to leave it there. Plaintiff thereupon let loose of the bar and started to step away from
the car. The other employees also let go of the bar and
it slipped and in a twirling motion hit plaintiff just
underneath the eye causing serious damage.
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Plaintiff alleged in his first cause of action that he
was an employee of the railroad company and that he
was injured by reason of the negligence of the car inspector of the defendant. In his second cause of action
he alleged that if he was not employed by the defendant
railroad company, then he was entitled to recover on
the theory of negligence by the defendant toward an
invitee upon the premises. The trial judge permitted
the case to go to the jury under the first cause of action,
holding as matter of law that the plaintiff was an employee of the railroad company. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of plaintiff and defendant appealed.
The circuit court affirmed plaintiff's judgment, relying
upon the Cimorelli case and concluded that the following matters were the controlling factors in that case,
at p. 164:
'' * * *In its overall estimate of the controlling facts in that case, it was pointed out that
the employment of the contractor was general,
that the number of cars to be unloaded or reloaded depended upon the demands of the business, that the work was to be done when, where
and in the proportions as the needs of the Railroad Company might justify, that the .Railroad
Company controlled the place where the work
was to be performed and in which there was a
frequent movement of cars, and that no part of
the premises was surrendered to the contractor.
The opinion then stated-' The whole project involved many interdependent details, the control
of any one of which could not be surrendered
without disorganization of the whole. From the
very nature of the work its performance could
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not be committed exclusively to the discretion of
the Duffy Company.' It then ruled that taking
into consideration the circumstances surrounding
the parties, the subject matter of the contract and
the object intended to be accomplished by its
performance, it was not the purpose of the parties
that the work should be performed by the Construction Company as an independent contractor."
These two cases were then followed by the Barlion
case, supra. The same railroad was the defendant as
in the Roth case. The same contract with the government was involved and the same type of contract had
been made with contractor as in the R:o'th case. The
plaintiff was an employee of that contractor. Plaintiff
brought his action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act contending that he was the employee of the
railroad company and that he had been injured by its
negligence. The defendant contended that he in fact
was an employee of the contractor and that there was
no liability on the part of the defendant for the injuries
plaintiff received. In referring to the two pr·evious
cases the court at p. 712, pointed out the controlling facts
and stated as follows, referring in particular to the
Cimorelli case :

" * * * that the court, in its over-all, estimate of the controlling facts in the latter case,
pointed out that the employment of the contractor was general, that the number of cars to be
unloaded or reloaded depended upon the demands
of the business, that the work was to be done
when, where, and in the proportions as the needs
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of the railroad company might justify, that the
railroad company controlled the place where the
work was to be performed and in which there
was a frequent movement of cars, and that no
part of the premises was surrendered to the contractor. It was further said that the whole project
involved many interdependent details, the control or any one of which could not be surrendered
without disorganization of the whole, and that,
from the nature of the work, its performance
could not be committed exclusively by the railroad to the contractor engaged in doing the unloading and reloading work and rendering the
other -services in question. The railroad had this
right of control in the instant case to the same
extent as it did in the Roth case; and it is the
right of control, rather than its exercise, that
determines whether or not a contractor is an independent contractor. The Roth case, therefore,
cannot be distinguished on the ground that the
control of the railroad company was there exercised, whereas it was not exercised in the present
case.''
When we consider these three cases in their application to the present case, it at once becomes apparent
that these authorities require a holding that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant railroad company.
In the case at bar the number of cars to be inspected
and heaters regulated depended upon the demands of
the railroad company's business; the work to be done
by plaintiff and other express company employees was
to be done when, where and in the proportions as the
needs of the railroad company mi_ght justify. The railSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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road company here controlled the place where the work
was to be performed and in these yards there was a
frequent movement of cars and certainly no part of
these pren1ises was surrendered to the express company..
In the case at bar the whole project was readying trains
in the yards of the railroad company for further interstate movements and involved many interdependent details, such as the switching and servicing of the cars and
the speed with which the work had to be done in order
that the trains could be put in movement aa soon as
possible.
The railroad company in this case not only had the
right to .supervise the work being done by plaintiff, but
also actually directed the work to be done by plaintiff
as evidenced by the switch list, Exhibit "5", which was
given to the express company employees to further the
business of the railroad company as a common carrier
by railroad in interstate commerce.
The defendants, in arguing the motion for a nonsuit, relied heavily upon the case of Gaulden v. Southern
Rae. Co., 78 F. Supp. 651, affirmed without opinion 174
F. (2d) 1022. In that case the plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act against
the Southern Pacific Company and the Pacific Fruit
Express Company. Plaintiff, at the time of his injury,
was employed as an iceman in the ice yard and plant
owned and operated by the Pacific Fruit Express Company at Bakersfield, California. He and fellow employees were engaged in unloading ice from a refrigeration
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car belonging to the express company. While he was
aiding in moving an empty car from a loading platform,
the wheels of a loaded car, which were being drawn
to the platform by a cable and winch, struck and injured
him. In that case the contract between the two defendant
companies was introduced in evidence. In the case at
bar, we have no such contract. In the G.aulden case it
appeared that the express company owned the ice ·yard
at Bakersfield where plaintiff was injured, and it further
appeared that service is provided from that plant to
the Southern Pacific Company and two other common
carriers as well. The court clearly recognized that it
could not be determined from the foregoing facts that
the plaintiff was rendering any services for the Southern
Pacific Company. That court stated at p. 656:

'' * * * Assuming the existence of an agency
relationship between Pacific Fruit Express Company and the Southern Pacific Company, nevertheless nothing of record indicates that plaintiff
was injured while pursuing activities related to
the alleged agency relationship between the two
defendants. The Pacific Fruit Express Company
performed refrigeration services at Bakersfield in
addition to those covered by the contract of July
1, 1942. It also served the Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Ry. and the Sunset Railway. The eventual destination of the ice which plaintiff was helping to unload at the time of his injury was neither
known or foreseen at the time. Thus nothing in
the record indicates that the plaintiff was injured
while employed in the service of his master's
master.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49
In the case at bar, plaintiff was not performing
services in the express company ice yards or ice house;
he was performing services in the yards and on the
tracks of the defendant railroad company. The defendant railroad company was the only railroad company
involved in this case. It appears conclusively that the
services rendered by plaintiff were for the exclusive
benefit of the defendant railroad company. Hence, the
Gaulden case is not authority for the defendant railroad
company in the case at bar under this point of plaintiff's
brief.
We submit that plaintiff was performing the work
of the defendant railroad company at the time of his
injury and that under the foregoing authorities he was
in the employ of the defendant railroad company and
hence could properly maintain his action against that
company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
POINT II
THE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY DEFENDANT RAILROAD COMPANY SEEKS TO HAVE EMPLOYEES OF THE
EXPRESS COMPANY AND NOT ITS OWN EMPLOYEES
PERFORM NECESSARY SERVICES ON ITS INTERSTATE
TRAINS AND CARS IS A CONTRACT OR DEVICE IN VIOLATION OF 45 U.S.C.A., SECTION 55.

Another reason why defendant cannot escape liability under the F.E.L.A. for plaintiff's injuries is because the arrangement whereby employees of another
company perform necessary services on its trains and
cars is a contract or device, the purpose and intent of
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which is to enable the defendant railroad company as a
common carrier to exempt itself from liability created
by that act.
45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 55, in so far as material here,
pr-ovides:
''Any contract, rule, regulation, or device
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall
be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself
from any liability created by this chapter, shall
to that extent be void."
The defendant express company is a corporation
organized under the laws of Utah in 1906. The stock
of that company, with the exception of a relatively small
number of shares, is owned in equal amounts by the
defendant railroad company and the Southern Pacific
Company, the latter being a railroad company (R. 266).
Under the contentions of the defendant railroad
company it has the employees of a company, of which
it owns approximately one-half of the stock, perform
services on its interstate trains and since those employees are not its employees it thereby avoids any liabilities
to them under the F.E.L.A.
Assume that there was a corporation known as The
Switching Company, the employees of which performed
all of the necessary switching operations on interstate
trains of the defendant railroad company at Laramie.
The switch list would be forwarded to the Laramie yard
office by employees of the defendant railroad company.
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This list would then be given to the clerk of The Switching Company in the yard office who would forward the
information contained therein to the company's yard
foreman. He would direct The Switching Company's
employees to cut certain cars out of the train and put
other cars in the train. After this operation was completed the defendant railroad company would again start
its train on its interstate journey. Under this arrangement with The Switching Company, and in accordance
with the contention of the defendant railroad company
in this case, the railroad company wouid be relieved
of all liability for injuries through negligence to employees of The Switching Company.
If the imagination of the officials of the railroad
company could devise enough companies to cover the
operationB necessary to conduct its business, it would
soon be freed of all liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. If its contention can be sustained in
this case, then there is no reason why it cannot continue
the formation of such companies to take over the various operations of a common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce.
We submit that if it may eliminate as employees
persons who .service and regulate refrigerator cars in
its interstate trains then by a parity of reasoning it may
eliminate switchmen, brakemen, enginemen, car repairmen, etc.
The services performed by plaintiff and other express company employees in servicing and regulating
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heaters ori refrigerator cars must be considered a necessary service on the railroad company'·s interstate trains.
The railroad company as a common carrier had undertaken to transport perishable commodities. These required, in order to be safely transported, that the cars
in which they were contained be maintained at temperatures which would prevent freezing and· resulting injury to those commodities. These services were as necessary to plaintiff's operations as the services performed
by the switchmen in cutting cars in and out of the railroad company's interstate trains. These services were
part and parcel of the railroad company's operations
as a common carrier.
In Gaulden v. Sout.he.rn Pac. Co., supra, the court
held that a somewhat similar arrangement did not violate 45 U.S.C.A., Sec. 55. It did so on the basis that the
express company was organized to commence business
before the enactment of the F .E.L.A.; it acquired none
of its operating facilities from the railroad company;
that the express company operated under its own management, with its own facilities and employees, and· that
the express company served other carriers in addition
to the defendant railroad company. We submit that none
of these reasons should ·permit the ·railroad company to
avoid liability under the F.E.L.A. 'The principal reason
suggested by the court in holding that there was' no
violation of this section of the act was that the express
company had been created before the act was passed
and therefore the contract or device could not have been
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created with the intent and purpose of exempting the
carrier from liability.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Oo. v. Schubert, 224 U. S.
603, 32 S. Ct. 589, at 592, 56 L. Ed. 911, stated as follows:
'' • • • that the provisions of Sec. 5 (this
section) were intended to apply as well to existing as to future contracts and regulations of the
described character cannot be doubted. The
words, 'the purpose or intent of which shall be
to enable any common carrier to exempt itself
from any liability created by this act,' do not
refer simply to an actual intent of the parties to
circumvent the statute. The 'purpose or intent'
of the contracts and regulations, within the meaning of the section, ia to be found in their necessary operation and effect in defeating the liability
which the statute was designed to enforce. Only
by such general application could the statute
accomplish the object which it is plain that Congress had in view. Nor can the further contention be sustained that, if so construed, the section
is invalid. The power of Congress, in ita regulation of interstate commerce, and of commerce in
the District of Columbia and in the territories, to
impose this liability, was not fettered by the
necessity of maintaining existing arrangements
and stipulations which would conflict with the execution of its policy. To subordinate the exercise
of the federal authority to the continuing operation of previous contracta, would be to place, to
this extent, the regulation of interstate commerce
in the hands of private individuals and to withdraw from the control of Congress so much of the
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ment to bring within the range of their agreements. The Constitution recognizes no such limitation. It is of the essence of the delegated power
of regulation that, within its .sphere, Congress
should be able to establish uniform rules, immediately obligatory, which as to future action should
transcend all inconsistent provisions. Prior arrangements were necessarily subject to this paramount authority.' ''
We submit that under the contentions of the defendant railroad company the arrangement between it and
the express company circumvents th'e statute and its necessary operation and effect defeats the liability which
that statute was designed to enforce. Such arrangement
is declared by the statute to be void and hence cannot
protect the railroad company from its liability under
the F.E.L.A. for the injuries sustained by plaintiff.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT EXPRESS COMPANY AT THE TIME
OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES WAS A COMMON CARRIER
BY RAILROAD IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

In operating its business a.:; a common carrier the
railroad company accepted for interstate transporation
perishable freight. In order to effectively transport such
freight it was necessary to have so-called refrigerator
cars. These cars are so constructed that the inside of
the cars may be maintained at temperatures either higher
or lower than the temperature outside by using either
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ice or charcoal heaters. Proper and varying ventilation
may be maintained by adjusting doors and bunker walls.
The express company by furnishing these cars and
the necessary services of inspection, regulation of heaters and the proYision of ice, has become a necessary
and integral part of the railroad company's business as
a common carrier by railroad. Hence, the express company and the railroad company in this case were engaged
in a joint enterprise, the purpose of which was to operate the business of a common carrier by railroad.
We .submit that this conclusion is inescapable and
that the plaintiff was employed in this business by both
companies. Under such circumstances the action was
properly brought ~gainst both of these defendants under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
POINT IV.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED
IN THIS CASE TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE CONTRIBUTED IN WHOLE OR IN PART TO THE
INJURIES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF.

In each of the motions for nonsuit the defendants
included as grounds that there waa insufficient evidence
of negligence and of proximate cause. Almost the entire
argument on these motions was directed to the propositions heretofore set forth in this brief. Little or nothing was said about the insufficiency of the evidence to
establish negligence and proximate cause if this case wa.s
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properly based upon the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. We will discuss this matter very briefly, and if the
defendants make substantial contention in their brief
that the evidence of negligence and proximate cause is
insufficient, we will file a reply brief in which we will
more fully discuss our contentions under this point of
our brief.
The evidence discloses that in the wintertime some
of the refrigerator cars on defendant's train were
equipped with heaters to prevent the perishable freight
from freezing. These heaters are in the small compartments at the ends of the cars. These compartments are
approximately 3 feet wide and 10 feet l<~mg. The heaters
when burning create carbon monoxide gas, the deadly
characteristics of which are well known. The men working in these bunkers frequently feel the effects of this
gas. They suffer headaches and dizziness. They are
affected by it, not while they are in the bunkers in its
presence, but after they have come out of the bunkers
and come in contact with fresh air. This gas is particularly dangerous because it is odorless and invisible
and the workmen are _given no warning of its presence or
the amount of it which is accumulated in these bunkers.
The defendant companies certainly are chargeable with
knowledge of the fact that such gas

it~

generated by the

burning of these heaters and with know ledge of its characteristics and effect upon the men working in it.
The defendants have promulgated a rule to protect
the men whose duty it is to regulate these heaters. (See
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Rule 19 d., Exhibit "4"). This rule is for their protection and had been in force and effect for many years in
the railroad company's Laramie Yards.
Just before the train involved in this case arrived,
the plaintiff's foreman told him that it was coming, gave
him the numbers of the cars and directed him to shut
off the heaters in those cars. The foreman told plaintiff
that the train was only to remain in the yards for five
or six minutes and that he would have to hurry in performing the duties of his employment. He was instructed
by the foreman to open but one plug on each car. Both
the .plaintiff and the foreman were on duty at this time,
yet the foreman directed the plaintiff, in violation of
the above rule, to do the necessary work on these three
cars while he was alone. Plaintiff proceeded to the place
where the cars were located and, after opening a plug
on each car, he returned to the first car. He descended
into the bunker in that car and shut off the heater. He
did the same on the second and third cars. Since plaintiff was alone it was necessary for him to enter all three
bunkers and there was no one present to assist him in
the performance of any of his duties. He thereby was
subjected to the carbon monoxide which had accumulated in the three bunkers in which the heaters had been
burning. Upon contacting the fresh air after being in
the three bunkers he became unconscious. The evidence
discloses that this would be the time when he would be
affected by the carbon monoxide gas and is in line with
the experience of the men who had been working where
this gas was present. When plaintiff fell from the top
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of the car he fell a distance of 16 feet, suffering a broken
hip and broken ribs.
We submit that under the well-established rules
laid done by the Supreme Court of the United States
this evidence furnished an evidentiary basis upon which
a jury could find negligence on the part of the defendants, or either of them, in directing the plaintiff to perform the duties of shutting off these heaters while he
was alone and in telling him to hurry with his work
because the train had to leave within five or six minutes
and thereby subjecting him to the carbon monoxide gas
in these bunkers without providing any means to eliminate this gas from the bunkers.
While there are no Supreme Court cases directly in
point on a situation of this type, we submit that under
the well known princi pies laid down by the following
cases, the testimony here should have been submitted
to a jury for its finding on the matter of negligence and
proximate cause. See Bailey v. Central Vermo-nt R. Co.,
319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444; Lavend.er v.
K urn, 326 U. S. 713, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 Adv. Ops. L. Ed.
692; Wilkerson v. McOarthy, 187 P. (2d) 188, 69 S. Ct.
29, 69 S. Ct. 413; Garay v. Southern Pacific Co., 69 S. Ct.
275; Tewnant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Oo., 321 U. S. 29;
64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; TilZer v. Atlantlic Coast Line
R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610.
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CONCLUSION
\Ve respectfully submit that the trial court committed error by granting the motions for nonsuit made
by each of the defendants in this case. Under the foregoing authorities we submit that the court should have
declared as matter of law that the plaintiff was an employee of each of the defendants and that the defendants
were common carriers by railroad in interstate commerce. ·The trial court should have submitted the question of the defendants' negligence and of proximate
cause to the jury.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK
& ROBERTS,
WAYNE L. BLACK,
DWIGHT L. KING,
Cownsel for Plaitntiff amd Appellant.
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